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1.  Introduction
Macroeconomists have long been interested in studying the stabilizing effect of different
policies. More than fifty years ago Friedman (1948) advocated a non-discretionary
monetary and fiscal framework for stability. It is not, however, always the case that
fluctuations are bad for welfare, since the equilibria associated with stable cycles can be
efficient. The resulting indeterminacy, however, can be an independent reason for
stabilization policy. An appropriate policy can render the equilibrium determinate, and
thus possibly rid the economy from the effects of sunspots and bubbles.
1
The possibility of cycles in simple overlapping generations models was observed
by Gale (1973) and Cass, Okuno and Zilcha (1979). Grandmont (1985) elaborated their
finding, and analyzed the conditions for the existence of cycles in a precise manner. From
the policy point of view Grandmont (1986b) pointed out that simple fiscal and monetary
policies involving proportional transfers and lump-sum taxes (or transfers) can abolish
the cycles completely. In his demonstration of sunspot equilibria Aiyagari (1988) showed
that there is a simple policy of proportional tax rate and lump-sum transfers, which can
stabilize the asset price completely, and thus rid the  economy from the effects of
sunspots. Goenka (1994) advocated a role for discretionary policies in a general
equilibrium model with public goods to abolish the sunspot equilibria, and thus stabilize
the economy. Ghiglino and Tvede (2000) studied a general overlapping generations
model with a prescribed objective function for the government. They showed that if the
discount factor is close to one, the optimal policy can completely stabilize the economy. 
There is a related literature, in which the role of various tax schemes as stabilizing
or destabilizing devices has been analysed in models with inefficiencies and/or
externalities. It is well known that one-sector real business cycle models with increasing
returns to scale may generate cycles driven by animal spirits. Guo and Lansing (1998)
showed that a progressive income tax schedule can stabilize the economy against animal
spirits type sunspot fluctuations. This is opposite to what happens in an economy with a
proportional or regressive tax schedule, when the economy becomes more susceptible to
                                                          
1 Woodford (1984) provides an excellent exposition of indeterminacy and related issues in overlapping
generations models.2
indeterminacy. Guo (1999) proved the same result for progressive labour taxation, even
when the capital tax rate is proportional.  In contrast to these results, Guo and Harrison
(2001) have used a two-sector real business cycle model with investment externalities to
show that a regressive tax policy can stabilize the economy against fluctuations driven by
agents’ animal spirits, while an economy with a proportional or progressive tax scheme is
more prone to sunspot fluctuations.
There is also a recent literature, where tax progression has not been an important
issue for stabilization. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (1997) showed in a neoclassical growth
model that a balanced budget rule may be destabilizing if fiscal policy relies heavily on
changes in labour tax rates to achieve budget balance by making higher tax rates self-
fulfilling. Guo and Lansing (2001) developed a discrete time one-sector growth model
with a productive externality to examine numerically the implications of various
government fiscal policies for endogenous fluctuations including different types of
cycles, quasi-periodic orbits and chaos.
In the real business cycle models, with inefficiencies and/or externalities,
summarized briefly above, the stabilizing role of proportional and non-proportional taxes
is sensitive to the details of model specifications. In this paper we re-examine these issues
in a simple overlapping generations model without inefficiencies or externalities.  We do
not allow lump sum taxes, but in contrast to Grandmont (1986) and Aiyagari (1988)
assume that government must use distortionary taxes to maintain balanced budget. More
precisely, we analyse the impact of proportional and linearly progressive taxes on cycles
and the local stability of equilibria.
We show the following results. Under proportional taxation the steady state
supply exceeds (falls short of) the one without taxation, if the elasticity of the marginal
utility of the second period consumption, is higher (lower) than one. This is because the
higher (lower) steady state supply in the presence of taxation is due to the fact that the
positive income effect of the tax rate dominates (is dominated by) the negative
substitution effect. In the presence of cycles, there is a critical level of tax rate above
which there are no cycles. Under progressive taxation the steady state supply is less than
the one with proportional taxation due to the negative income effect of tax exemption on
supply. In this case we show that there is a critical level of tax exemption, such that for3
all tax exemptions below that level there are no cycles in the economy. Hence, a
sufficiently high tax rate and a low tax progression eliminate cycles.
We also characterize the effects of tax policy on the local stability of equilibria,
and show the following results. First, if the lifetime utility function is quasi-linear,
increasing the tax rate can cause the economy to become locally unstable both with
proportional and linearly progressive taxation so that tax exemption does not matter. This
is because the income effect of tax exemption is zero for consumption.  Second, if the
lifetime utility function is not quasi-linear, we show that for small tax rates an increase in
progression can locally destabilize the economy.
We proceed as follows. In section 2 we present an overlapping generations model
with a balanced budget fiscal policy. Section 3 characterizes competitive equilibrium
with proportional taxation, the relationship between the level of taxes and cycles, and the
impact of tax policy on the local stability of equilibria. In section 4 we ask what are the
implications of linearly progressive taxation on cycles and local stability. Finally there is
a concluding section.
2. An Overlapping Generations Model with Fiscal Policy
We consider a simple overlapping generations model without population growth, with
perfect foresight, and a constant stock of money. Producer-consumers consume when old
and produce when young. The person born at t has the following additively separable
lifetime utility function
(1)  ) ( ) ( ) , ( 1 1 t t t t n v c u n c U     ,
where  1  t c denotes consumption when old, and  t n  labor supply in youth. Labor is
transformed to output,  t y , in a linear fashion so that  t t n y  , while  ) (c u  is an increasing
strictly concave function, and  ) (n v  an increasing strictly convex function. We denote the



























.  Given our
assumptions it follows that  1 ) 0 ( ' / ) 0 ( '  u v . This means that the slope of the indifference4
curve at the endowment point is less than unity. This assumption is needed for monetary
equilibria in this model. Using the terminology in Gale (1973) we have  here a Samuelson
case.
We consider a simple fiscal policy with a balanced budget, where government
taxes the output (income) produced by the young, and uses the proceeds to buy output
from the market. We study the potential effects of taxation both in terms of the
relationship between tax level and cycles as well as in terms of local stability of
equilibria, and compare the results of proportional taxation with those of progressive
taxation.
To study the effects of progressive taxation in a simple manner we assume that
there is a nominal exemption on the taxable income and a constant marginal tax rate, i.e.
t t    .
2  Total tax revenues in period t are thus
(2)  ) ( t t t t E n p T   ,
where  t tn p  is the nominal tax base (i.e. price times output of the young), and  t E  denotes
the nominal exemption, which we assume to be constant as well, i.e.  t E Et   . The








t t t n p
E
n p T 1 /  , which is less than the marginal tax rate .
The tax schedule (2) is progressive in the sense that even though the marginal tax rate is
constant, the average tax rate increases with the tax base. 
3 An increase in the average tax
rate is higher the higher is the marginal tax rate and tax exemption when the tax base
goes up.
The government budget constraint in the absence of debt financing is
(3)  ) ( E n p T g p t t t t t     .
We emphasize that the real government expenditure,  t g , is not a given sequence, but it
adjusts every period to the level necessary to maintain balanced budget.
With proportional taxation the government budget constraint is
                                                          
2 For the definition of progressive taxation, see the seminal paper by Musgrave and Thin (1948). See also
Lambert (1993), chapters 6-8, for further analyses, Sandmo (1983) and Koskela and Vilmunen (1995) for
various applications.
3 Guo and Lansing (1998, 2001) parametrize tax progression such that both the marginal and average tax
rates will increase with the tax base. See also Guo (1999) and Guo and Harrison (2001).   5
(4)    t t n g   .
3.  Competitive Equilibrium with Proportional Taxation
In this section we provide the answers to the following questions. First, under what
conditions are there cycles in the model? Second, can the proportional taxation eliminate
cycles. And third, what is the effect of the tax rate on the local stability of equilibrium.
We first study the properties of competitive equilibrium in the presence of
proportional taxation. The private sector periodic budget constraints are
(5i)
d
t t t M n p   ) 1 ( 
(5ii)
d
t t t M c p    1 1 ,
from where we have the lifetime constraint as
















The young producers accumulate money by selling their output to the old, and part of it
to the government. The first-order condition for the utility maximization subject to
budget constraints (5i) and (5ii) is







































. If supply is
increasing in the after tax real wage ( 1 / ) 1 (   t t p p  ), a rise in the tax rate will decrease
supply, while the reverse happens if supply is downward sloping.
The equilibrium condition for the goods market is








Taking into account the government budget constraint, (4), and the fact that the nominal






) 1 (    .6
Using equation (9) in the first-order condition (7) we can re-express it as
(10)    ) ( ' ) 1 ( ' ) 1 ( 1 1 t t t t n v n n u n        ,
This equation determines the equilibrium sequence of supplies for a given tax rate, and
implicitly defines the reflected generational offer curve.
4
If the second period utility function,  ) ( 1  t c u , is logarithmic, the proportional tax
rate will have no effect on the equilibrium sequence. The dynamics is then determined
from the condition  1 ) ( '  t t n v n , so that the economy stays forever at the steady state, n ˆ ,
determined from  1 ) ˆ ( ' ˆ  n v n .
In order to explore the impact of fiscal policy we first ask: How does the steady
state solution to (10) (denoted by n ˆ ) compare to the steady state supply without
proportional taxation,  * n . The answer is given in
Proposition 1. Under proportional taxation the steady state supply exceeds (falls short
of) the one without taxation, if the elasticity of the marginal utility of the second
period consumption (or the Arrow-Pratt measure of the relative risk aversion),
denoted by  , is higher (lower) than one, i.e.































 Proof: Rewriting  equation (10) in the steady state as
 ) ( ) ( ' ) 1 ( ' ) 1 ( ) ; ( n RHS n v n u n LHS         and given the Inada conditions we have






, and  0 ) ( '  n RHS . We also have  0 ) ; (   n LHSn .
We calculate     n nu n u n LHS ) 1 ( ' ' ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ' ) ; (            , and re-express
  ) ( 1 ) 1 ( ' ) ; ( n n u n LHS         , where    n u n nu n ) 1 ( ' / ) 1 ( ' ' ) 1 ( ) (          . Note
that consumption in steady state is  n ) 1 (   . When  1 ) (  n  , the curve  ) ; (  n LHS  shifts
up, if the tax rate is raised. The results of Proposition 1 follow from this observation.
Q.E.D.
                                                          
4 The geometric techniques of the reflected generational offer curves, developed by Cass, Okuno and Zilcha
(1979), are useful in characterizing properties of equilibria in many overlapping generations models.7
  Proposition 1 follows from a property of the Slutsky equation. The higher (lower)
steady state supply with than without taxation is due to the fact that the positive income
effect of the tax rate dominates (is dominated by) the negative substitution effect.  The
Slutsky equation can be written as  m
c nn n n     , where 
c n  is the negative substitution
effect and  m nn   the positive income effect. The latter (former) effect – evaluated at
0  m  -  dominates if  . 1 ) ( ) (   n   (for a precise elaboration of this intuition, see
Appendix).
We differentiate (10) to get
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dn
dn
   
.
We drop the subscripts and note that the second period consumption equals  n ) 1 (   .
Equation (11) cannot be signed generally since the sign of the denominator is a priori
ambiguous. Defining     n nu n u n D ) 1 ( ' ' ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ' ) 1 ( ) (            we can express it as
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Defining the elasticity of the marginal utility of the second period consumption (or the
Arrow-Pratt measure of the relative risk aversion) as
     n u n nu n ) 1 ( ' / ) 1 ( ' ' ) 1 ( ) (          , and using it we can rewrite equation (12) as
 ) ( 1 ) ( ' ) ( n n u n D    . Thus we see that  0 ) (  n D , when  1 ) (  n  . This means that it is
necessary for backward bending offer curve (and indeed for cycles) to have  1 ) (  n  .
5
To explore the stabilizing effect of proportional  taxation on cycles we use the
following notation in equation (10) above
(13)      n nu n U ) 1 ( ' ) 1 ( ;        and  ) ( ' ) ( n nv n G  .
6
Since function  ) (n G is monotone increasing we can invert it, and obtain from (13) the
following relation
(14)    ) ( ; 1 1
1
 
    t t t n n U G n   .
                                                          
5 This is well known since the seminal paper by Grandmont (1985).
6 To explore this issue we follow Grandmont (1986), and partly Aiyagari (1988).8
which is actually the inverted reflected generational offer curve. Note that this equation
describes the backward perfect foresight dynamics of equilibrium. The reason for
studying backward dynamics here is because the properties of  ) ( 1   t n   are easier to
relate to the shape of the reflected generational offer curve than to the respective curve
for backward bending forward dynamics. If there is no subscript in the RHS of (14) it
then refers to the case without taxation.
To make this problem interesting from the point of view of cycles and the effect
of policies on them we assume that there can be cycles in our model economy. For the
existence of a two cycle (or a periodic point with period two) it is necessary that function
) (n  (economy without taxation) is downward sloping. That property, however, is not
sufficient for periodic solutions of higher order. To have periodic points with period three
and more, it is necessary that the curve,  ) ( 1    t t n n , must be hump-shaped. And more
precisely, if there are three cycles in the economy without taxation (see Figure 1), there
must, according to Sarkovskii’s theorem, be periodic solutions of any order higher than
three.
7 It is also well known that cycles in overlapping generations models are intimately
connected with sunspot equilibria.
8 Below we present a parametric specification of our
model and provide conditions under which we get a hump-shaped offer curve.
Next we ask: Is there a proportional tax policy, which can eliminate cycles? We
provide a positive answer in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. There is a critical level of the proportional tax rate,  ˆ , such that for all
  ˆ  , there are no cycles in the economy.
Proof: Let  ' n  be the maximum of the function  ) (n   such that  ' ) ' ( n n   . We see that
the maximum for the function  ) (n   is at  ) 1 /( '   n . The maximizing point of
) ( 1   t n  can then be increased in such a way that ultimately we have for some  , say  ˆ ,
                                                          
7 An elementary discussion and elaboration of Sarkovskii’s theorem can be found e.g. in Holmgren (1996),
see in particular chapter 5. On the conditions for the existence of cycles of more than two periods in
economic models, see Grandmont (1986b).
8 Azariadis and Guesnerie (1986) showed that a two cycle is enough for the existence of a stationary
sunspot equilibrium. Their results were partly refined by Chattopadhyay and Muench (1999).9
that   ) ˆ 1 /( ' ) ˆ 1 /( '        n n . It follows that  0 ) ˆ ( ' 1    n  , where n ˆ  is the respective
steady state, which in turn means that there can be no cycles. Q.E.D.
Hence, according to Proposition 2 a sufficiently high proportional tax rate will
eliminate cycles by changing the location and slope of the inverted reflected generational
offer curve. In Figure 1 we have described an economy without taxation but with cycles
(curve  ) ( 1    t t n n ) and an economy with proportional taxation, and with such a policy
that there can be no cycles (curve  ) ( 1    t t n n  ). In the latter case the tax rate is high
enough to suppress the cycles. The steady state is stable in backward dynamics, and is
denoted by n  in Figure 1.
Figure 1.
* n ' n
t n
1  t n
) ( 1    t t n n 
) ( 1    t t n n
n ˆ
To be able to study more precisely the relationship between proportional taxation,
cycles and local stability of equilibrium, we consider a parametric example, which allows
for backward-bending reflected generational offer curve.  We specify the lifetime quasi-
linear utility function
9 as follows: The consumption preferences are described by
) 1 /( ) ( ) (
1 
   
 a c c u , where a denotes a relative luxury of consumption
10, and the
                                                          
9 Quasi-linearity is often used in the welfare analyses to simplify the presentation, see e.g. Laffont (1988),
pp.158-161.
10 For a further discussion of this specification , see e.g. Auerbach and Hines (2001).10
preferences for disutility of labor are linear,  n n v  ) ( . We assume here that  1   , which
both lies in conformity with empirics
11,  and yields possibly interesting dynamics.  Under




















where we have used the notation:  1 1 /    t t t p p R . Differentiating (15) with respect to the





































































































These equations show that the interest factor and the tax rate have an opposite effect on
supply. Clearly, the supply function can be backward bending with respect to the interest

















 , the supply function is backward bending with respect to the tax
rate. This means that decreasing the tax rate will decrease the supply and vice versa.
Next we analyze the properties of competitive equilibrium for this example with
the assumption that  1   . Utilizing (10) we get in equilibrium


















where we calculate the steady state  ) 1 /( ) 1 ( ˆ
1
1
      

a n . Note that the steady state
without taxes is  a n  1 * . By direct differentiation with respect to the tax rate we can
see that  * ˆ n n  , if  1   .
12 Differentiating (17) we get
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11 See e.g. a recent survey by Attanasio (1999).
12 See Proposition 1.11
To get the hump-shaped offer curve described in Figure 1, and thus to allow for periodic
solutions of order higher than two we need to have the maximum of the offer curve,
) 1 )( 1 /(     a , to be less than the steady state,  ) 1 /( ) 1 (
1
1
     

a . This will lead to
















. If the tax rate exceeds  ˆ ,
there can be no cycles in this economy as noted in Proposition 2 above.
Finally we explore the local stability of equilibrium. Evaluating the slope of (18)
at the steady state yields
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where the numerator should be negative for cycles. Inverting (19) we get the following
stability condition for the local forward looking perfect foresight dynamics
(20)  1













We can rewrite it as
(21)  1 1
) 1 (


































and    ~ ˆ  . According to (21) increasing the tax rate above  ~ can make the economy to
become unstable. Whether this happens depends also on the magnitudes of the relative
luxury of consumption,  , a  and on the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption,  .
14
                                                          
13 It is important to keep in mind here that we are studying forward dynamics. The result in Proposition 2
was proved by exploring the backward dynamics.12
4.  Competitive Equilibrium with Progressive Taxation
It has been recognized in the earlier literature on fiscal policy that progressive taxation
operates as an automatic stabilizer to smooth business fluctuations.
15 In the real business
cycle models, summarized in introduction, the stabilizing role of progressive taxation is
sensitive to the details of model specifications. In this section we re-examine this issue in
our model and study the effects of linearly  progressive taxation from the same
perspective as we did for proportional taxation, and compare the results to those
presented above.
The private sector periodic budget constraints are now
(22i)  
d
t t t M E n p     ) 1 (
(22ii)
d
t t t M c p    1 1 ,
















The young producers accumulate money by selling their output again to the old, and part
of it to the government. The first-order condition for the utility maximization subject to
budget constraints (22i) and (22ii) is




















































Taking into account the government budget constraint and the fact that the nominal
money supply is constant we can rewrite (25) for periods t and t+1 as
(26) E n p M t t      ) 1 ( ,  E n p M t t        1 1 ) 1 ( .
                                                                                                                                                                            
14 This can also be seen by differentiating the left-hand side of equation (21) with respect to the tax rate,
and noting that the partial derivative will be negative.13
From (26) it follows that  1 1    t t t t n p n p , which means that the tax base stays constant
also outside the steady states. Now we can develop the first-order condition above as





















From (26) we solve 
1










. Plugging this into (27) yields
(28)   ) ( '
1
) 1 (


























which determines the equilibrium sequence of supplies. If the second period preferences
are logarithmic, the dynamics is determined from the condition  M E n v n t t / 1 ) ( '    , i.e.
the economy stays forever at the steady state, n ~, determined from  M E n v n / 1 ) ~ ( ' ~    . It
is also interesting to note that the level of nominal money supply affects the intertemporal
allocation in the presence of progressive taxation.
  Now we ask: How does the steady state solution to (28) (denoted by n ~) under
progressive taxation compare to the steady state with proportional taxation, n ˆ . The
answer is given in
Proposition 3. The steady state supply under progressive taxation is less than the supply
with proportional taxation.
Proof: We rewrite equation (28) in the steady state as
) ( ) ( '
1
) 1 (




















  . Given the Inada conditions we have






, and  0 ) ( '  n RHS . We also have  0 ) , ; (  E n LHSn  .
We calculate  0
1
) 1 (






















E n LHSE 
  
   so that the
                                                                                                                                                                            
15 See e.g. Friedman (1948), Musgrave and Miller (1948) and Slitor (1948).14
) , ; ( E n LHS   shifts down, when tax exemption is increased. Proposition follows from
this finding. Q.E.D.
This proposition is not surprising, since in competitive models progressive taxation is
more distortionary than the proportional taxation. A higher level of tax exemption
decreases the steady state supply due to the negative income effect of tax exemption on
supply.
To explore the stabilizing effect of taxation on cycles we use the following
notation in equation (28)























' ) 1 ( , ; ˆ  and  ) ( ' ) ( ˆ n nv n G  .
Since function  ) ( ˆ n G is monotone increasing we can invert it, and obtain from (29) the
following relation




    t E t t n E n U G n  ,
which is again the inverted reflected generational offer curve, where subscript E  refers to
the case of progressive taxation. If there is no subscript in (30), it then refers to the case
without taxation. We assume that there is at least a two-cycle in the economy without
taxation (see Figure 1). As with proportional taxation the hump-shaped form of equation
(30) is not necessary for two cycles, but it is necessary for three cycles.
16
Next we ask: Is there a progressive tax policy, which can stabilize the economy
by eliminating cycles? We provide an answer in the following proposition.   
Proposition 4. Given the marginal tax rate there is a critical level of tax exemption, , ˆ E
such that for all  , ˆ E E   there are no cycles in the economy.
Proof: Let  ' n  be the maximum of the function  ) (n   such that  ' ) ' ( n n   . The maximum
for the function  ) (n   is thus at  ) 1 /( '   n , and for the function  ) (n E   at
                                                          
16 See footnote 7 above.15





. The maximizing point of  ) ( 1   t E n can then be increased by
decreasing  E  i n  s u c h  a  w a y  t h a t  u l t i m a t e l y  w e  h a v e  f o r  s o m e   E , say E ˆ , that
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E . This also means that  0 ) ~ ( ' 1    n E , where
n ~ is the respective steady state, which in turn means that there can be no cycles. Q.E.D.
Hence, according to Proposition 4 a sufficiently low progressive taxation –
meaning that the average tax rate does not increase with the tax base too quickly - will
eliminate cycles.
Next we consider our example specified in section 3 above. Analogously to the


























where the term,  t p E/ , is the real exemption. Differentiating (31) with respect to the tax

























































We find from (32i) that for a given interest factor decreasing the tax rate will decrease the




































Now we analyze the competitive equilibrium for this specification again with the
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n .  This can be
expressed in terms of the steady state with proportional taxation as   n
M
E
n ˆ ) 1 ( ~ 
  .
Hence, introducing tax exemption, which makes taxation progressive, decreases the

































































1 ) 1 (















where the numerator must be negative. Inverting (36) and rearranging we get the stability
condition for the local forward looking perfect foresight dynamics to be
(37)  1 1
) 1 (

















According to (37) increasing the tax rate can cause the economy to become
unstable, i.e. if   increases enough the inequality sign might turn around depending on
the relative size of parameters a and  .
17  Note that this condition is exactly the same
                                                          
17 This can also be seen by differentiating the left-hand side of (37) with respect to the tax rate, and noting
that the partial derivative will be negative.17
(c.f. equation (21)) as with the presence of proportional taxation. This is due to the quasi-
linear specification of the lifetime utility function, which is strictly concave in
consumption and linear in leisure and labor supply. Therefore the income effect of tax
exemption is zero for consumption.
Finally we consider an example where – unlike in the case of quasi-linear utility
function - the income effect for consumption is not zero. We assume that disutility
function ( ) (n v ) is of the form 
2 ) 4 / 1 ( ) ( n n v   









































While we cannot explicitly solve for the steady state, we, however, get from (38) the
following relation at the steady state
(39) ) ; (
) 1 ( 2
1
) 1 (






























The left-hand side of (39) is an increasing, and the right-hand side a decreasing function
of supply,  . n  Furthermore, we see from (39) that  0 )) , , ; (  M E n LHSE  . This means that
an increase in the level of exemption will shift the  ) , , ; ( M E n LHS   curve up, so that
there is a negative relationship between the steady state employment and exemption, i.e.
0 /    E n .
                                                          
18 This kind of specification for the disutility function has been used in a different context by Farmer and
Woodford (1997).18






































































Again we concentrate on the case, where  1   , so that the above slope can be negative.
Next we evaluate the slope at the steady state. Using (39) and evaluating (40) at the






































































Developing (41) further yields
(42)  
) 1 ( 2 ) 1 ( 2
) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 (
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Inverting (42) provides the following stability condition for the forward dynamics
(43)  1
) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 (
) 1 ( 2 ) 1 ( 2
 













Taking into account the fact that the denominator is negative we can re-express (43) as





      ,
so that in this specification it is necessary for stability that  3   . Since the steady state
employment is a decreasing function of exemption, both sides of (44) are decreasing19
functions of exemption. If the tax rate and/or the relative luxury, a, are small enough, we
can see that increasing the level of exemption turns around the inequality sign in (44),
and makes the steady state unstable.
5.  Conclusions
We have studied the effects of distortionary tax policy on cycles and the local stability of
equilibria in a simple overlapping generations model with a balanced budget rule.  In
particular, we have explored the implications of the details of the tax system on these
issues.
We have shown that under proportional taxation the steady state supply exceeds
(falls short of) the one without taxation, if the elasticity of the marginal utility of the
second period consumption, is higher (lower) than one. This is because the higher (lower)
steady state supply in the presence of taxation is due to the fact that the positive income
effect of the tax rate dominates (is dominated by) the negative substitution effect.
Moreover, in the presence of cycles there is a critical level of tax rate such that for all
higher tax rates there are no cycles in the economy. The steady state supply under
progressive taxation is less than the one with proportional taxation due to the negative
income effect of tax exemption on supply. In this case there is a critical level of tax
exemption, such that for all smaller tax exemptions there are no cycles in the economy.
Hence, a sufficiently high tax rate and low tax progression eliminate cycles.
We have also characterized the effects of tax policy on the local stability of
equilibria by providing the following results. First, if the lifetime utility function is quasi-
linear, increasing the tax rate can cause the economy to become locally unstable both
with proportional and linearly progressive taxation so that tax exemption does not matter.
This is because the income effect of tax exemption is zero for consumption.  Second, if
the lifetime utility function is not quasi-linear, then for small tax rate an increase in
progression can locally destabilize the economy.20
Appendix:
                        Derivation of the Slutsky equation for the supply function
Maximizing the utility function  ) ( ) ( n v c u U    subject to  m n c    ) 1 (  , where m  is
non-labor income, gives  ) ( ' ) 1 )( ( ' 0 n v c u Un      , which implicitly defines the supply
function  ) , ( m n n   . Substituting this for nin  U gives the indirect utility function
o U m U  ) , (
*   with the following properties:  0 ) ( '
* *   c u Um  and  . 0
* *    m nU U Given
the monotone 
*
m U  we can invert the indirect utility function for m so that we have the
following expenditure function,  ) , (
o U h m   . Substituting this for m in 
o U m U  ) , (
* 
yields the compensated indirect utility function
19 
o o U U h U  ) ), , ( (
*   with the following
property  0
* *     U h Um  so that  .
* * n U U h m       According to the duality theorem we
can write the relationship between the uncompensated and compensated supply as
follows  ) , ( ) ), , ( (
o c o U n U h n     . Differentiating this with respect to the tax rate gives
c
m n h n n       which can be written as the Slutsky equation   m
c nn n n      ,
where we have the negative substitution effect,  ) 0










 , and the
positive income effect,  ) 0
) ( ' ' ) 1 )( ( ' '




n v c u
c cu
nnm 
 . The latter (former) effect
      evaluated at  0  m  dominates if  . 1 ) ( ) (   n 
                                                          
19 See Diamond and Yaari (1972).21
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